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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, funding for homelessness services has increased at the federal and local
levels. At the same time, funding for long-term, subsidized housing has decreased or stagnated.
Washington, D.C. (“the District” or “D.C.”), like many other cities, has responded with programs
like Rapid Re-Housing,1 which offers short-term assistance to move individuals from a shelter
into an apartment. The assistance ranges from a security deposit and/or first-month’s rent to four
to eighteen months of a partial rent subsidy, which decreases over time and eventually disappears.
Rapid Re-Housing is sold as a “Housing First” model.2 Housing First is “a proven
approach in which people experiencing homelessness are provided with permanent housing
directly and with few to no treatment preconditions, behavioral contingencies, or barriers.”3 As
this definition makes clear, Housing First is not about temporary housing; it is about placing
people in sustainable, permanent housing.
At least in the District, however, Rapid Re-Housing often fails to move people into
sustainable housing situations, and thus fails to meet the basic Housing First criteria. Much of the
fault lies with the current imbalance between market rents and wages earned by low-wage
workers (and income supports received by those unable to work). Indeed, stagnant wages and
subsidies in an increasingly expensive rental market make it nearly impossible for Rapid ReHousing to be an independently viable housing solution for most of the homeless or nearhomeless population. For example, a two-parent family with both adults working full-time at
minimum wage ($1,7504 a month each) would not be able to sustainably rent a two-bedroom at
$1,470 (the average fair-market rent in the ten cheapest neighborhoods in D.C.). 5 To be

1

Although the critique is primarily focused on the District, it draws upon national trends and proposes a
model that is adaptable to different locations. An important source of data beyond the District is a HUD-Commissioned
study published in July 2015. See DANIEL GUBITS ET AL., FAMILY OPTIONS STUDY: SHORT-TERM IMPACTS OF HOUSING
AND SERVICES INTERVENTIONS FOR HOMELESS FAMILIES (2015) http://www.huduser.gov/portal/publications/
affhsg/family_options_study.html [hereinafter “Family Options Study”].
2
See, e.g., NATIONAL ALLIANCE TO END HOMELESSNESS, RAPID RE-HOUSING: A HISTORY AND CORE
COMPONENTS 2 (Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.endhomelessness.org/library/entry/rapid-re-housing-a-history-and-corecomponents (“A key element of rapid re-housing is the “Housing First” philosophy, which offers housing without
preconditions such as employment, income, lack of a criminal background, or sobriety.”) and U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING &
URBAN DEVELOPMENT, HOMELESSNESS PREVENTION & RAPID RE-HOUSING: COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVES 2009 REGIONAL
HPRP TRAINING, https://www.hudexchange.info/resources/documents/DCCommunityPerspectives.pdf (the program is
“[m]odeled after a nationally recognized prevention program called the TCP Community Care Grant”).
3

UNITED STATES INTERAGENCY COUNCIL, HOUSING FIRST, https://www.usich.gov/solutions/housing/
housing-first (last accessed Jan. 26, 2016). The website describes Rapid Re-Housing as a housing first model, and “an
intervention designed to help individuals and families quickly exit homelessness and return to permanent housing.”
4

We assume 40 hours per week, 50 weeks per year at the District’s minimum hourly wage of $10.50. We
assume 50 weeks per year rather than 52 because low-wage workers often have unpaid days due to sickness, family needs,
or simply lost shifts.
5

Note that two adult families among the homeless population are relatively rare—the average is 1.25 adults
per family unit. HILARY CHAPMAN, METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS, RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
FROM THE 2015 POINT-IN-TIME COUNT OF PERSONS EXPERIENCING HOMELESSNESS IN THE METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON
REGION, 12, https://www.mwcog.org/uploads/pub-documents/v15bWlk20150514094353.pdf [hereinafter “Homelessness
in Metropolitan Washington Report”]. The homelessness statistical figures used in this Article are based upon the 2015
Point-in-Time Study. See infra Appendix I for detailed information regarding fair-market rent in these ten neighborhoods.
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sustainable, as defined by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”),
rent should not exceed thirty percent of income. Accordingly, to sustainably rent a two-bedroom
apartment, a two-parent family with both adults working full-time at minimum wage would need
an extra 146 hours of paid labor per month (or a third person working 36.5 hours per week).
A single mother with two kids working full time at minimum wage earns $1,750 per
month, and could not possibly afford a $1,470 a month, two-bedroom apartment in D.C. After
paying rent, she would be left only with $280 a month to cover all other costs. Indeed, to meet the
minimum sustainable threshold of thirty percent of income, she would need to nearly triple her
earnings to $4,900 a month. In short, market rents make it highly improbable that someone in a
homeless shelter will be able to reach an income level enabling them to sustain the full cost of
market rent before the subsidy dries up.
Despite this reality, Rapid Re-Housing is often touted as an affordable solution to an
expensive problem. It is politically appealing to help homeless families with a temporary subsidy
promising to establish them in a stable housing situation. Rapid Re-Housing purports to keep
costs low and to deliver a long-term, low- or no-entitlement solution to a housing crisis that leaves
millions of people homeless or at risk of homelessness.
Rapid Re-Housing also offers a quick fix to the visible and upsetting problem of rundown and dangerous homeless shelters overflowing with at-risk populations. Political support for
the program has twice followed acute crises in the District. First, legal changes in 2007
necessitated the rapid movement of 150 families out of shelters that no longer met minimum
standards.6 Second, in 2014, a child disappeared from D.C. General, a family homeless shelter,
and her disappearance brought attention to the atrocious conditions at the shelter.7
Faced with this type of situation, it is easy to assume that it is best to move people out of
the shelter as quickly as possible and worry about a permanent solution later. No one wants
individuals and families to languish in shelters. 8 Unfortunately, there are a few issues with this
quick fix. As a threshold matter, it allows policymakers to avoid implementing more expensive,
On May 11, 2016, the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments Released the 2016 Point-in-Time Study. See
http://www.mwcog.org/uploads/pub-documents/ol5aXVo20160511153522.pdf. Homelessness in the District, as counted
in the point-in-time studies, only increased further between 2015 and 2016, with an approximately 34 percent increase in
homeless families (a 14 percent increase in total homeless persons) and an approximately 3.5 percent decrease in homeless
single individuals. Id. at 62. The decrease in homelessness among single individuals is primarily attributed to decreases in
single veteran homelessness, itself at least partially attributed to increased availability of permanent housing vouchers for
veterans through the jointly-implemented HUD-Veterans’ Affairs Supportive Housing Program (VASH). Id. at 2.
6

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, HOMELESSNESS PREVENTION AND RAPID
RE-HOUSING: COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVES, 2009 HPRP TRAINING, SLIDE 7 (2009), https://www.hudexchange.info/
resources/documents/DCCommunityPerspectives.pdf.
7

Azmat Khan & Lori Jane Gliha, Are we doing enough to protect homeless children?, ALJAZEERA
AMERICA (Mar. 27, 2014), http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/america-tonight/articles/2014/3/27/are-we-doingenoughtoprotecthomelesschildren.html (discussing the disappearance of eight-year-old Relisha Rudd from a D.C.
homeless shelter).
8

Whether Rapid Re-Housing amounts to a better short-term solution to homelessness (effectively, as a
form of shelter) than D.C. General or placement in a motel is a separate question not addressed in this article. The program
is sold to policymakers and potential beneficiaries alike as a long-term solution—a connection to stable housing—and
analyzed as such in this article. Measuring Rapid Re-Housing as an alternative to shelter alone, i.e., as a short-term
solution, would require a connection to some longer-term solution that is not currently part of the program as implemented
in the District.
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long-term solutions to reduce the size of the sheltered homeless population by relying on a shortterm solution pregnant with the promise of a long-term solution.9 As we discuss below, however,
it is a promise on which they are unlikely to be able to deliver.
Moreover, Rapid Re-Housing-related eviction cases in D.C.’s landlord-tenant court
suggest that the program is not only failing to provide a long-term solution to many individuals—
it is creating new obstacles and problems. 10 A typical case is that of Anne*, a woman with a child
whose only income was Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”), a fixed monthly salary based on
her status as an individual with disabilities rendering her unable to work, and food stamps. 11
Although her income (excluding food stamps) was $733 per month and subject only to minimal
changes for inflation, she was placed in a Rapid Re-Housing Program to exit from a homeless
shelter. She and her child were housed in an apartment with market rent of $1,250 and given a
subsidy such that she paid forty percent of her income toward rent for the first four months, fifty
percent the next four months, and sixty percent for the next four months. At the end of the twelvemonth term, the subsidy terminated and she was responsible for the entire $1,250 rent–an amount
that was nearly double her income. When she inevitably could not pay market rent, she ended up
in eviction court for non-payment of rent.
Many participants face eviction proceedings even before the subsidy ends because they
are forced to pay an unsustainable portion of their income toward rent even while receiving the
subsidy, as detailed further below. 12 For an individual not yet at the end of the possible subsidy
term in eviction proceedings, the option to move with the subsidy could provide a way out of a
bad situation. Unfortunately, even if the individual is at risk of homelessness because of a pending
eviction proceeding, the individual will likely not be permitted to move with the subsidy through
the Rapid Re-Housing program to another property solely to avoid an eviction. 13
Eviction proceedings entail risks beyond physical eviction for tenants, a consequence
many tenants are able to avoid by rapidly vacating the unit. The case becomes part of the tenant’s
rental history, making it much more difficult and expensive for the individual to rent an apartment
in the future. Accordingly, tenants unable to remain permanently housed through Rapid Re-

9
Homelessness in Metropolitan Washington, supra note 5, at 64 (counting Rapid Re-Housing as
permanently housed).
10

See Beth Mellen Harrison, Washington Post Articles Highlight Opportunities, Challenges Presented by
Rapid Re-Housing Program, MAKING JUSTICE REAL (Aug. 20, 2013), http://www.makingjusticereal.org/washington-postarticles-highlight-opportunities-challenges-presented-by-rapid-re-housing-program (discussing Legal Aid’s experience
with Rapid Re-Housing evictions).
11
This example is based on personal experience representing individuals in the D.C. landlord-tenant courts
but not any one specific client. More common still is the tenant whose only household income is Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF), often resulting in a household income of only $441 for a family of three, as detailed more fully
infra Section V.A.
12
See infra Section III.A. Too often, Rapid Re-Housing tenants also face eviction because the subsidy
provider has failed to make its own payments to the tenant’s landlord. See Patricia Mullahy Fugere, Testimony Before the
D.C. Council Committee of the Whole, Public Oversight Hearing on Contracting for Homeless Services Continuum (Sept.
28, 2015), http://www.legalclinic.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Testimony-before-the-DC-Council-COW-Hearing-onTCP-Contract-Renewal-9-28-2015.pdf.
13

Although pending eviction proceedings are a basis for issuing an emergency transfer voucher in the
federally-subsidized, long-term Housing Choice Voucher Program as administered in the District, they are not grounds for
a move with a Rapid Re-Housing subsidy.
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Housing can end up worse off than they began in shelter—often substituting a negative rental
history for no rental history, after having lost their spot in a shelter and uprooted their family. 14
These issues with the program are largely obscured by the methodology for measuring
the program’s success. Success is measured primarily by a lack of return to shelter. This fails to
account for the fact that the right to shelter in the District existed only during the winter months
for years prior to Autumn of 2015— by the time the subsidy dried up, the individual may have
been unable to get a bed at the shelter. Other individuals facing homelessness may choose not to
return to shelter, especially given difficult conditions often present in shelters. Either way, the
individual who does or did not return to shelter is not counted. The methodology also fails to
account for doubling up and other makeshift living situations. Lastly, it does not consider the
negative effects on people who stay in the apartment but sacrifice other necessities like food,
childcare, and transport in order to pay the rent.
In this article, we evaluate Rapid Re-Housing and suggest that for Rapid Re-Housing to
be a true Housing First solution for most of its potential beneficiaries, it must be (1) paired with
affordable housing tied to the minimum wage (or other markers more relevant to extremely-lowincome families than Area Median Income), (2) used as a bridge until a long-term subsidy
becomes available, or (3) otherwise linked to a longer-term solution. This is consistent with
evaluations of Rapid Re-Housing that underscore the significantly greater benefits of long-term
subsidies as compared to Rapid Re-Housing.
Because Rapid Re-Housing as currently implemented in the District primarily targets
individuals and families who are already homeless, we begin by providing an overview of what
we know (and what we do not know) about the characteristics of the District’s homeless
population. We then explore current rental market conditions in the District, finding a severe
mismatch between wages and rent (to say nothing of public benefits and rent) that has a profound
impact on the likelihood of successfully using Rapid Re-Housing, at least in isolation, to move
homeless individuals and, especially, families toward sustainable housing over the long-term.
Taking a step back, we then analyze studies available on the results of Rapid Re-Housing
programs. Finding that studies fail to identify the most likely beneficiaries of the temporary
subsidy, we attempt to fill this gap. By combining data regarding the homeless population and the
rental market in the District, we identify the profiles of those individuals most likely to benefit
from the current Rapid Re-Housing (short-term subsidy) model and propose minor modifications
to increase the likelihood that those in the program will be sustainably housed after the short-term
subsidy ends. Lastly, and most importantly, we acknowledge that Rapid Re-Housing’s short-term
subsidy in isolation cannot move most homeless individuals to sustainable, long-term housing
absent significant other interventions in the form of long-term subsidies or market interventions to
create housing affordable for individuals and families with extremely low incomes.

14
See Written Testimony of Shirley Horng, Legal Aid Society of the District of Columbia Before the
Committee of the Whole, Committee on Health and Human Services Council of the District of Columbia, Joint Public
Oversight Roundtable on Homelessness in the District of Columbia (Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.legalaiddc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/02/SHorng1.30.15.pdf.
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A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE D.C. HOMELESS POPULATION

HUD defines homeless individuals and families for purposes of eligibility for homeless
services programs as those “who lack[] a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime residence.”15
Regulations further clarify that homelessness includes living in a place not designed or used for
sleeping accommodations, such as cars and parks, residing in emergency shelters, and losing
nighttime residence within fourteen days of the application for assistance.16
The homeless population so defined is often divided into two primary groups: the
chronically homeless and the episodically homeless. The federal government has defined chronic
homelessness narrowly to include only families or individuals with disabling conditions who have
been continuously homeless for a year or more, or had at least four episodes of homelessness in
the last three years adding up to a total of at least twelve months of homelessness. 17 The
episodically homeless include all others who are homeless, but do not meet the federal definition
of chronically homeless.
Available data reflect a decline in chronic homelessness and a marked increase in
episodic, family homelessness. As explained in Section IV.A below, however, the reported
decline in chronic homelessness may be largely illusory, and the increase in episodic family
homelessness may be even greater than what the available data portray.
A. Characteristics of D.C.’s Homeless Population Based on the 2015 Point-in-Time Survey
Like many other cities, Washington, D.C. relies on an annual “point-in-time” count to
quantify the homeless population and identify basic demographic features of the population.
Conducted in a single twenty-four-hour period in late January, point-in-time studies are
unduplicated counts of the sheltered and unsheltered homeless population. 18 The District’s 2015
survey counted 7,298 homeless individuals, including 3,821 single-homeless adults and 1,131
homeless families.
Based on the 2015 survey, the median age of single homeless adults is forty-nine years,
whereas the median age of a homeless adult with children is twenty-four years (a quarter of adults
in homeless families in D.C. were between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four).19 The
demographic distinctions between homeless families and individuals go beyond median age and
are often quite dramatic.
Individuals. Among single homeless adults, employment income was the most
frequently reported source of income. Yet only 19.3 percent of single homeless adults reported

15

24 C.F.R. § 91.5.

16

Id. Certain individuals fleeing domestic violence, youth under age 25, and families including youth under
age 25 are also defined as “homeless” under the regulations even if they do not otherwise meet this definition.
17
24 C.F.R. § 91.5(iii)(G)(1)(ii). To qualify as chronically homeless under the section of this definition
requiring four episodes of homelessness in a three-year period, those episodes must be separated by at least seven nights of
staying in places not safe for human habitation or emergency shelters. See also § 91.5(iii)(G)(1)(i).
18
NATIONAL ALLIANCE TO END HOMELESSNESS, FACT SHEET: POINT-IN-TIME COUNTS (Nov. 2010),
http://www.endhomelessness.org/library/entry/fact-sheet-point-in-time-counts.
19

Homelessness in Metropolitan Washington Report, supra note 5, at 11.
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being employed.20 Nearly sixty-three percent reported no income of any kind. 21 Among single
homeless adults, 16.9 percent reported a physical disability, 2.1 percent reported living with
HIV/AIDS, 10.3 percent reported other chronic health problems, 7.4 percent self-identified as
Limited English Proficient, and 10.3 percent identified as veterans. 22 Only 2.7 percent of single
homeless adults reported that domestic violence constituted an immediate cause of their
homelessness.23 Just over 40 percent of single homeless adults were identified as chronically
homeless.24 Only 193 of about 1,100 transition-aged-youth (youth aged eighteen to twenty-four,
including those transitioning out of foster case and juvenile detention, among others) were
identified as single-homeless adults.25
Families. The average homeless household included 1.8 children and 1.25 adults, 26
suggesting that the most common family unit is one parent with two kids. Homeless family
members accounted for 3,477 individuals, of whom 910 were transition-aged-youth.27 Although
employment rates did not differ dramatically between homeless families and homeless individuals
(approximately 25 percent of adults in families reported being employed), 28 the rest of the picture
between the two populations was quite distinct. The most commonly reported income source for
families was Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), and only 14.2 percent of adults
in families reported having no income of any kind. 29 This means that some sort of government
benefit was the primary source of income for most homeless families—a very different set of
circumstances from homeless individuals, and a very important factor in considering income and
potential income for Rapid Re-Housing purposes.
The reported factors precipitating homelessness are also different between homeless
families and single-homeless adults. Domestic violence was a significant factor in family
homelessness, with approximately 15 percent of homeless families reporting domestic violence as
an immediate cause of their homelessness.30 In contrast, health and disability appeared to be a less
significant factor among homeless families. Among adults in homeless families, 2.9 percent
reported a physical disability, 10.1 percent reported severe mental illness or chronic substance
abuse, 0.6 percent reported living with HIV, 1.8 percent reported another chronic health problem,
2.7 percent identified as Limited English Proficient, and 1.1 percent were veterans. 31 Perhaps
because only individuals with disabilities qualify as chronically homeless, only 66 families were

20

Id. at 64.

21

Id.

22

Id.

23

Id. at 63.

24

Id. at 64. Out of a total of 3821 single homeless adults, 1,593 were identified as chronically homeless.

25

Id. at 32.

26

Id.

27

Id.

28

Id. at 64.

29

Id.

30

See id. at 64. The 2015 survey identified 1,131 homeless families, including a total of 3,477 people (of
whom 1,428 were adults and 2,049 were children). Id. at 63.
31

Id. at 64.
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classified as chronically homeless.32
Foster youth. It is worth highlighting the significant number of transition-aged youth
reflected in the data (about 25 percent of adults in homeless families in D.C.). According to a
sweeping July 2015 HUD study on family homelessness, “[o]f the adult respondents in this
study’s sample, 27 percent had lived in foster care, a group home, or some institutional setting as
a child. NSHAPC [The National Survey of Homeless Assistance Providers and Clients] showed
very similar patterns of childhood housing instability among people who subsequently became
homeless, with about 25 percent of the adults in homeless families reporting that they had been in
foster care, a group home, or another institutional setting as a child.”33 This high number makes
sense as, according to some studies, 65 percent of foster youth exit the system without a place to
live.34
The differences between homeless families and individuals as reflected in this data, as
well as specific issues faced by foster youth, have implications for paths to sustainable housing, as
explored more fully later in this Article.
B. What Information Is Likely Missing? Critiques of Point-in-Time Surveys as Measures of
Homelessness
Data in recent years reflects a decline in chronically homeless individuals 35 and a steady
increase in homeless families in the District. 36 The increase in family homelessness is often
attributed to the unavailability of affordable units in a high-rent market, a reduction in federallysubsidized housing—particularly Housing Choice Vouchers—due to sequestration, and a
demographic increase in families headed by single adults aged 18-24 with limited income-earning
capacity over the short term.37 The data, however, likely underestimate both long-term and
episodic homelessness. Most of the data comes from point-in-time studies conducted to comply
with federal funding requirements and follows methodologies prescribed by HUD, with some
local additions.38 Point-in-time studies use HUD definitions, including the HUD definition of
chronic homelessness, which requires the presence of at least one person with a disability in the

32

Id.

33

Family Options Study, supra note 1 at 7 (citing MARTHA R. BURT ET AL., Helping America’s Homeless:
Emergency Shelter or Affordable Housing?, Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press (2001)).
34
See, e.g., Inspire Life Skills Training, Inc., The Problem, https://inspirelifeskills.org/the-problem (last
accessed Jan. 25, 2016).
35

See Homelessness in Metropolitan Washington, supra note 5 at 24 (finding a 24 percent decline in
chronically homeless adults in D.C. between 2011 and 2015).
36

Id. at 11.

37

Id. at 11-12.

38

U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT, 2014 POINT-IN-TIME COUNT METHODOLOGY GUIDE,
https://www.hudexchange.info/resources/documents/PIT-Count-Methodology-Guide.pdf (last modified Sept. 2014). The
District’s 2016 Point-in-Time study showed a dramatic increase in homeless families (an approximately 34 percent
increase over 2015 figures), in part because changes in District law regarding access to shelter increased the number of
homeless families in shelter as compared to unsheltered families, increasing the accuracy of the point-in-time count. See
http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/news/blog/20780098/yearround-access-to-shelter-meansincrease-in-homelessfamily-countand-more-accuracy.
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household.39
This narrow definition of chronic homelessness, and particularly its requirement that the
chronically homeless also have a disability, likely overestimates truly episodic, or short-term,
homelessness by classifying the experiences of some long-term homeless individuals and families
as episodic simply because of the absence of a disability. It would be valuable to also measure
prolonged homelessness exclusively based on the length of time the individual or family has been
homeless or the number of homelessness episodes the individual or family has endured over a
period of time. For ease of comparison, one might rely on HUD’s standard of continuous
homelessness for a year or more or at least four episodes of homelessness in a three-year period.40
Though some prolonged homelessness may be mischaracterized as episodic, point-intime surveys still likely undercount the episodically homeless. The survey is conducted in a single
24-hour period, and may therefore miss a large percent of the episodically homeless. The
Department of Education and many school systems use more inclusive measures of child
homelessness, counting the number of children who report being homeless within an academic
year, which is likely a better measure for capturing short-term homelessness.41 School-based
measures of homelessness also employ a broader definition of homelessness itself—capturing
children “doubling-up,” or living with friends and relatives, often at imminent risk of
homelessness.42 In contrast, HUD point-in-time studies deliberately do not include doubling-up or
couch-surfing in the measure of homelessness, a shortcoming that is particularly likely to
underestimate youth and young adult homelessness. 43 Point-in-time studies similarly omit people
living in overcrowded housing, which often poses an imminent risk of homelessness. 44 Surveys
including individuals doubled up, couch-surfing, in unsustainable housing situations, and in
eviction court45 might provide a more accurate picture of the near-homeless population in the city
than the point-in-time surveys can capture.46
A further gap in most current studies of homeless populations is that many studies,

39

24 C.F.R. § 91.5.

40

Id.

41

Homelessness in Metropolitan Washington, supra note 5, at 14. See also American Institutes for
Research, America’s Youngest Outcasts: A Report Card on Child Homelessness, (Nov. 2014), 13, http://www.air.org/
sites/default/files/downloads/report/Americas-Youngest-Outcasts-Child-Homelessness-Nov2014.pdf.
42

Homelessness in Metropolitan Washington, supra note 5, at 14.

43

Id.; See also Howard Balshem et al., U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE
LITERATURE REGARDING HOMELESSNESS AMONG VETERANS, 21-22, (April 2011), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
books/NBK55702/.
44

Balshem, et al., supra note 43.

45

For example, approximately 200 cases are heard, in a variety of procedural statuses, in the District’s
eviction court (Landlord and Tenant Branch) each weekday. See Bread for the City, Just Another Tuesday @ BFC,
http://www.breadforthecity.org/tag/dc-superior-courts-landlord-and-tenant-branch (identifying 250 cases a day). A total of
32,592 cases eviction cases were filed in landlord-tenant court in the District in 2015. See District of Columbia Courts,
Court Cases Online, https://www.dccourts.gov/cco/maincase.jsf (indicating that the last case number filed in 2015 was
2015 LTB 32592). This is an average of approximately 130 eviction filings per business day in the District during calendar
year 2015.
46
Among the nearly homelessness, point-in-time surveys typically only include those within 14 days of
losing their housing and with no family or other support on which to rely. 24 C.F.R. § 91.5 (1)-(2).
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including point-in-time studies, ask whether individuals are sheltered or unsheltered—i.e., they
focus on what happens after they became homeless rather than on events that might have
precipitated the episode of homelessness. For example, both point-in-time studies and common
intake tools for homelessness services do not include detailed (or sometimes even any) income
and/or employment data.47
Without a better understanding of the diversity of the homeless and near-homeless
populations and the durations and causes of their homelessness, it is difficult to accurately target
services—including programs such as Rapid Re-Housing—to meet people’s needs and capitalize
on their potential.
II.

RAPID RE-HOUSING: GOALS, LIMITATIONS AND EXPECTATIONS

Washington D.C.’s Rapid Re-Housing, like many others, was supported by the federal
government through the American Recovery Act Homelessness Prevention and Rapid ReHousing Program (HPRP), which aimed to “provide financial assistance and services to prevent
individuals and families from becoming homeless and help those who are experiencing
homelessness to be quickly re-housed and stabilized.”48 HUD expected that HPRH resources
would target “households that are most in need and that are most likely to achieve stable housing”
with the overall goal of achieving housing stability for the participants. 49 In this vein, HUD
intends that HPRP programs will “rapidly transition assisted persons to housing stability,”
including “affordable market rate housing or subsidized housing, as appropriate.”50 Local
governments were expected to tailor their HPRP programs to meet the distinct needs of their
population.51 The District has done so, and the city continues to support its own Rapid ReHousing Program through the Family Re-Housing and Stabilization Program (“FRSP”).
In April 2016, regulations for the FRSP Program became final after years of temporary
regulations, labeled emergency and proposed rulemaking. 52 “The purpose of the Family ReHousing and Stabilization Program is to support District residents, who are experiencing
homelessness or at imminent risk of experiencing homelessness, to achieve stability in permanent
housing through individualized and time-limited assistance.”53
47

For example, a common tool known as the SPDAT does not ask directly about whether an individual or
household has any income or any employed adult household members. See OrgCode Consulting, Inc., http://www.orgcode
.com/product/vi-spdat (last accessed January 25, 2016).
48

Homelessness Prevention and Rapid Re-Housing Program, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URBAN
DEVELOPMENT, http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/recovery/programs/homelessness. Federal dollars have
decreased for Rapid Re-Housing since 2009, but local dollars continue to fund the program through the Family ReHousing and Stabilization Program as described below. See Jonathan J. Sheffield, Homeless Bills of Rights: Moving
United States Policy Toward a Human Right to Housing, 22 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 321, 322 n.10 (2015).
49
Christine Ricciardi. HUD program keeps 750,000 Americans from homelessness, HOUSING WIRE (Dec.
6, 2010), http://www.housingwire.com/articles/print/hud-program-keeps-750000-americans-homelessness.
50

Id.

51

Id. To that end, the District’s program is integrated into and governed by the Homeless Services Reform
Act of 2005 (HSRA), effective October 22, 2005 (D.C. Law 16-35; D.C. Official Code §§ 4-753.01, 4-755.01, 4-756.01
and 4-756.02 (2008 Repl. & 2012 Supp.).
52

Department of Human Services, Notice of Final Rulemaking, 63 D.C. Reg. 5273 (April 8, 2016).

53

29 D.C.M.R. § 7800.1.
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Applicants for the FRSP program are expected to find and take the steps necessary to
lease and move into an apartment within approximately 30 days of receiving notice of
eligibility.54 Agencies determine eligibility based on various factors, including that the applicant
demonstrate a reasonable expectation of sustainable housing at the end of the FRSP support
period, based on factors such as current income, expected future income, rental history,
employment history, willingness to take steps to increase income, past use of FRSP, and the
likelihood of receiving other subsidized housing within twelve months.55
The target for exit from financial supports is 12-18 months or less.56 The initial term of
the subsidy, however, is discretionary and provided in the “Notice of Eligibility Determination” to
the tenant. Typically the initial term is three or four months. 57 If the assistance provider
determines at the three, six, nine, or twelve month review that the participant will likely be unable
to sustain housing stability independently at the end of the FRSP assistance period, the provider
may (1) advise the participant that they can seek an extension of assistance, if funding is available,
(2) help identify other, more permanent housing assistance, or (3) consider appropriate shared
living circumstances.58 The regulations make clear that, “FRSP is not an entitlement and the
program is not designed to be an indefinite bridge to long-term affordable housing; therefore,
length of participation in the program beyond eighteen (18) months may be a valid factor for
denial of an extension.”59
According to the regulations, “[p]articipants may exit because they no longer require
FRSP supports, by program termination, or because they reached the length of time for which
their participation was approved (inclusive of applicable program extension).”60 The discretionary
nature of the term of the subsidy is a significant weakness in the program: participants cannot rely
on the subsidy, as they will never know what might happen at the conclusion of the next threemonth time period. This is also problematic because tenants typically must enter one-year lease
terms, but the subsidy is not necessarily provided for that full lease term. This makes the program
unattractive to landlords and tenants alike. 61
Even the amount of rental assistance (the difference between the cost of the apartment
and the tenant’s portion of the rent) provided is highly discretionary: the tenant household is
required to contribute a minimum of 40 percent and a maximum of 60 percent of its adjusted
annual income toward the monthly rent.62 This 40-60 percent requirement is a significant red flag,
suggesting that the program cannot place people in sustainable long-term housing.

54

Id. at § 7801.4.

55

Id. at § 7803.2.

56

Id. at § 7805.9.

57

Id. at § 7803.5(d).

58

Id. at § 7805.9.

59

Id at § 7805.10.

60

Id. at § 7807.1.

61

Although landlords in the District cannot refuse a tenant solely based on their source of income,
including a housing subsidy, landlords often express frustration with the program. It is reasonable to believe that at least
some landlords attempt to avoid participating in the Rapid Re-Housing program as a result. See D.C. Code § 2-1402.21(a).
62

Fourth Emergency and Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 52 at § 7805.11.
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A. The Current Rapid Re-Housing Model Does Not Place Individuals at a Sustainable Rent to
Income Ratio, Even During the Program.
Sustainable housing, as defined by HUD, requires that an individual spend 30 percent or
less of their income on rent. According to HUD, “[f]amilies who pay more than 30 percent of
their income for housing are considered cost burdened and may have difficulty affording
necessities such as food, clothing, transportation and medical care.”63 A severe rent burden is
defined as paying more than 50 percent of one’s income on rent.64 Yet the Rapid Re-Housing
subsidy requires that individuals contribute 40-60 percent of their income to rent while receiving
the subsidy—which ensures that the families are either cost burdened or severely rent burdened
even with the subsidy.
Based on its own sustainability goals, and HUD’s standards, the Rapid Re-Housing
program must aim to ensure that upon exiting the program, the individual or family will be in a
rental situation where they are paying under 30 percent of their income in rent. The 30 percent of
income standard is necessary to place the individual in a stable housing situation, i.e., the person
can arguably afford basic necessities beyond housing, and will not lose her home if she has an
emergency, is forced to take unpaid sick or family leave, her car breaks down, or she has to pay
for childcare.
Even 30 percent of income may not be sustainable for an extremely low-income
household in Washington D.C. A recent Businessweek article quotes Frank Nothaft, chief
economist at Freddie Mac, taking issue with HUD’s approach. “If your income is $500,000 a
year, you can pay 40 percent and still have money left. But if your income is $20,000 a year, it
will be hard to make ends meet if you’re paying 30 percent of your income on rent.”65 This makes
sense: a full-time worker paid minimum wage who spends 30 percent of her income in rent is left
with approximately $280 a week to cover all other costs. 66 A person with a disability receiving
SSI spending 30 percent of their income is left with approximately $128 a week to cover all other
costs.
While $280 per week may be enough non-rent spending money in some areas of the
country, cities like Washington, D.C. have a relatively high cost-of-living, meaning that this
money simply does not go as far. 67 In addition, families with children spend more on clothing,
food, and medical bills than do single adults. 68 Nor does the 30 percent account for tradeoffs
families make to reduce housing costs, such as long commutes to work (at high cost) or home
quality (with, for example, higher utility costs connected to poor quality housing). 69
Despite evidence that even the 30 percent rent/income ratio is unsustainably high for
63

HUD, Affordable Housing, http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/comm_planning/
affordablehousing/ (last accessed January 25, 2016).
64
HUD User, Rental Burdens: Rethinking Affordability Measures, https://www.huduser.gov/portal/
pdredge/pdr_edge_featd_article_092214.html (last accessed January 25, 2016).
65

Id.

66

A worker earning full-time minimum wage earns approximately $21,000 per year. See infra Section

67

Id.

68

Id.

69

Id.

III.B.2.
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extremely low-income households, the Rapid Re-Housing program—meant to target the most
vulnerable, homeless low-income households—requires that households contribute 40-60 percent
of household income toward rent while receiving the subsidy. That means that to achieve
sustainable housing at the conclusion of the subsidy, whenever that moment may come, the
household members would need to find sufficient income not only to replace the subsidy amount
but also to reduce the portion of their income they are already spending on rent. As explored more
fully below, especially given the gap between wages and rental market prices, Rapid Re-Housing
as currently implemented is not designed to enable participants to achieve sustainable housing
over the short or long term.
B. There Is a Glaring Mismatch Between D.C.’s Rental Market and Typical Incomes for
Homeless Individuals
1. Fair Market Rents in D.C.
According to HUD, the proposed Fair Market Rent (FMR) in D.C. as of January 2016
was $1,292 for an efficiency, $1,386 for a one-bedroom apartment, $1,604 for a two-bedroom
apartment, and $2,119 for a three-bedroom apartment. This is a citywide average, and there are
less expensive units available in some areas of the city (just as in some areas of the city, one could
not find a rental unit consistent with these prices). To look at the rental market that homeless and
near-homeless populations are specifically confronting, we use the average FMR in the ten most
affordable neighborhoods (of 56 neighborhoods defined by the D.C. Housing Authority) in the
District to calculate a reasonable rental expectation. The FMR represents the amount that the
District of Columbia Housing Authority (DCHA) is willing to pay for homes of this size in each
of these ten neighborhoods, set forth in Table 1, attached hereto as Appendix I. 70 The monthly
FMR averages across these ten neighborhoods are approximately $1005 for an efficiency, 71 $1150
for a one-bedroom, and $1470 for a two-bedroom.
We recognize that these averages are imperfect proxies for monthly rental rates, as they
represent the maximum rates DCHA is willing to pay per unit by neighborhood and not the actual
average rent even within a given neighborhood. Nevertheless, a search on DChousingsearch.org72
suggests that these averages are good estimates of the lowest rent (unsubsidized) apartments
available in the District.73 While there are some less costly units available, there are not enough of
70
District of Columbia Housing Authority, HCVP Rents, http://www.dchousing.org/rent_hcvp.aspx (last
accessed January 26, 2016). Effective March 2, 2016, DCHA increased the FMR, slightly increasing the average FMR for
the ten least expensive neighborhoods, as defined by DCHA, in the District. The increases are relatively small, with the
average as of March 2, 2016 for an efficiency increasing to $1039, for a one-bedroom to $1225, and for a two-bedroom to
$1489.4. See Appendix I. These changes are minimal and would only result in a greater rent-income mismatch for lowincome residents of the District if incorporated into this analysis.
71
The District of Columbia has incorporated the International Property Maintenance Code into its housing
code regulations. Under the Property Maintenance Code, efficiencies can house up to a maximum of three people and only
if the floor area is at least 320 square feet, excluding kitchen and bathroom facilities. IPM Section 404.6.
72
DCHousingsearch.org is a website managed by the District’s Department of Housing and Community
Development providing a free search engine to locate “affordable housing.” See http://dchousingsearch.org/About.html
(last accessed January 27, 2016).
73
A search on DChousingsearch.org, excluding senior-only properties and properties with a waitlist, for
example, yields 48 properties with units for under $1000 a month for an efficiency/one-bedroom and 64 one-bedroom
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those units to house the 888 families currently in the Rapid Re-Housing program or the 700
families currently in homeless shelters and overflow motel rooms. 74 It is also likely that some
units on the market for lower prices would not meet minimum habitability standards. Given the
supply-demand imbalance, most families would not be able to get the few decent apartments
available at these rates. As a result, the FMR averages that we use ($1005 for an efficiency, $1150
for a one-bedroom apartment and $1470 for a two-bedroom apartment) represent a best-case
scenario for low-rent housing in these neighborhoods and a likely underestimation of the actual
rental costs for tenants in these areas. For many, rent will be substantially higher than these
averages. Regardless, these imperfections are insignificant in the context of our analysis: placing
individuals in sustainable housing under the current system would be impossible even if we
significantly reduced these low-end figures. To the extent actual rents are higher, the impossibility
is only that much more overwhelming.
2. Income in D.C.
Minimum wage in the District as of July 1, 2015 is $10.50 an hour. 75 An individual who
is able to work a full 40-hour week for 50 weeks a year (assuming at least 10 unpaid work days in
the course of a year for sick or family leave, cancelled shifts, or similar reasons) can be expected
to earn $1750 per month, on average, for an annual pre-tax income of $21,000.76 Not all homeless
or near-homeless individuals are earning minimum wage. Most earn much less; some may earn
more. Nevertheless, minimum wage is a good starting point to optimistically evaluate most of the
affected population’s “current” and “expected future income,” and therefore, their ability to meet
the stated goals of Rapid Re-housing.
3. The Income-Rent Mismatch
The lowest rents in the city are well over 30 percent of a full-time, minimum-wage
earner’s monthly income. In a best-case scenario, an individual earning $1750 a month (full-time
minimum wage) renting an efficiency unit at $1005 a month would be spending 57 percent of
their income on rent, or roughly twice the sustainable amount. This leaves them in the expensive
DC market with $745 a month or approximately $165 a week (pre-tax) to cover all their food,

properties at under $1200 a month. Many of the properties appear to have just one available unit, and many of the options
under $1000 are shared housing, such as rooms for rent or single-room occupancy buildings, which means they can only
accommodate a single adult. In turn, there are 76 properties with two-bedroom units listed at under $1500 a month in D.C.,
excluding senior properties and properties with waitlists. These are the lowest cost units in the city.
74

The Washington Post, More D.C. families are living in homeless shelters at the start of winter than ever
before — and it’s by design, Oct. 31, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/more-dc-families-are-livingin-homeless-shelters-at-the-start-of-winter-than-ever-before—and-its-by-design/2015/10/31/0bcc5e9c-7f44-11e5-b575d8dcfedb4ea1_story.html (last accessed January 25, 2016).
75
National
Conference
of
State
Legislators,
State
Minimum
Wage
Chart,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/state-minimum-wage-chart.aspx (last accessed September 7, 2015).
76

We just use the pre-tax figure. In all likelihood, the family probably earns only slightly more than
$21,000, with the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) returning withheld taxes. For a female-headed household of two
children, often typical of individuals in emergency homeless shelters, the EITC is $5460, which means that there is not a
significant reduction in taxes. The tax-related reduction in net income will increase, however, as wages increase.
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transport, and other costs. For this single adult individual to get to the sustainable amount of 30
percent of income, they would need an apartment that cost $525 a month. Put another way, for a
homeless individual already working full-time at the minimum wage would need a 91 percent
increase in wages to $3,350 a month in the course of just one year to meet the 30 percent
threshold for a $1005 efficiency. Some individuals may find relief by searching for single rooms
for rent, rather than apartments, which according to DChousingsearch.org are likely available for
between $550 and $750 per month. 77
But for a single mother with two kids to sustainably rent a $1470 a month two-bedroom
apartment in D.C., she would need to earn $4900 a month (or $58,800 a year) to meet the 30
percent threshold. Put another way, a single mom would need more than a 180 percent increase
from a full time minimum wage job ($10.50 an hour to $30 an hour) to get to a sustainable 30
percent ratio of salary to rent, the equivalent of a family with the approximate median D.C.
household income of $100,000 a year jumping to $280,000 a year. This is clearly an unrealistic
expectation.78
Even a two-person family with both adults working full-time would not be able to afford
a two-bedroom unit at $1470 and cover their necessities. 79 To sustainably afford a two-bedroom
apartment at $1470 a month, a two-parent family with both adults working full-time and earning
minimum wage ($3,360 combined a month) would need an extra 146 hours of paid labor per
month (or a third person working 36.5 hours per week).
In short, fair market rent simply does not align with realistic wage expectations for lowwage workers. HUD is well aware of this problem. “An estimated 12 million renter and
homeowner households now pay more than 50 percent of their annual incomes for housing. A
family with one full-time worker earning the minimum wage cannot afford the local fair-market
rent for a two-bedroom apartment anywhere in the United States.”80
4. Significance of the Mismatch for Rapid Re-Housing
The above-described mismatch between the realities for low-income families, even those
with full-time workers—to say nothing of families relying solely on Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families or Social Security Insurance to survive—has significant implications for Rapid
Re-Housing’s vision of the utility of a short-term subsidy moving homeless individuals into
sustainable, unsubsidized housing over the long-term. As a threshold matter, the wage-rent
mismatch makes it difficult to understand how D.C.’s Rapid Re-Housing program is able to find
“eligible” individuals—let alone families—in homeless shelters with a “reasonable expectation”
of sustainable housing based on factors such as “current income, expected future income, rental

77
Rooming houses are often advertised only informally and rooms for rent through such informal networks
may be available for less than the formal listings in DChousingsearch.org. However, it is important to note that conditions
in such rooming houses are often substandard.
78

Others have also noted this mismatch as an obstacle to program success. See Horng Testimony, supra

note 14.
79

Note that two adult families are rare—the average is 1.25 adults per family unit. Homelessness in
Metropolitan Washington Report, supra note 5, at 32.
80
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, “Affordable Housing,”: http://portal.hud.gov/
hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/comm_planning/affordablehousing/ (last accessed January 31, 2016).
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history, employment history,” and willingness to take steps to increase income.81
Based on the average FMRs for the ten most affordable neighborhoods in the District, a
homeless individual already working full-time at the minimum wage would need a 91 percent
increase in wages in the course of just one year to meet the 30 percent sustainability threshold for
a $1005 efficiency. Of course, for an individual working less than full time or not earning any
income at all (only 19.3 percent of homeless, single individuals reported being employed in the
District’s 2015 Point-in-Time Study),82 the increase would have to be even more dramatic.
The outlook is particularly bleak for families. The majority of the District’s homeless
families are made up of children and a single adult (the average number of adults in homeless
families counted in 2015 was 1.25 and the average number of children 1.8). A mother of two
children working full-time and earning minimum wage at the time she begins the Rapid ReHousing subsidy (a small minority of the homeless population), to sustainably rent a two-bedroom
without a subsidy at the conclusion of a one-year subsidy, would need 180 percent increase in her
wages in the course of one year. But most of those families report TANF as their only source of
income, which for an average three-person family provides $441 per month.83
In addition to the rent-wage mismatch, there is a mismatch between the population the
program aims to serve and those it is most likely to help achieve sustainable housing over the
medium- or long-term. The stated program goal is to serve the households most in need.84 But the
current rent-wage mismatch insures that those most in need (i.e., families without employment)
would need a miracle to achieve stable housing through the stand-alone, short-term subsidy.
In the following sections we attempt to untangle these issues. First, we will consider the
current data on Rapid Re-Housing’s effectiveness. Second, we will combine the data about the
District’s rental and low-wage worker markets with the data about the District’s homeless
community in order to identify any subset(s) of the city’s homeless population that Rapid ReHousing’s short-term subsidies, standing alone, might help to find sustainable housing. Lastly, we
consider how Rapid Re-Housing could be combined with other programs and solutions to
maximize its likelihood of helping the most vulnerable and extremely low-income people achieve
sustainable housing.
III. LIMITED DATA IS AVAILABLE REGARDING RAPID RE-HOUSING’S RESULTS
AND THE PEOPLE MOST LIKELY TO BENEFIT FROM THE PROGRAM
The dramatic mismatches between rental rates and low-wage incomes and between
Rapid Re-Housing’s various goals raise critical questions: Is Rapid Re-Housing “working” and, if
so, for whom? As discussed more fully below, data on Rapid Re-Housing’s effectiveness in
moving individuals and families into sustainable, affordable housing is sparse. Most program
evaluations focus on return to shelter or the lack of physical evictions as the only signs of
program failure, rather than counting individuals doubled-up or moving out under quick move-out
agreements once an eviction case has been brought against them. Still, program evaluations

81

See Catholic Charities, “Family Re-Housing Stabilization Program (FSRP)” at https://www.catholic
charitiesdc.org/FRSP and Fourth Emergency and Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 52 at § 7803.2.
82

Homelessness in Metropolitan Washington Report, supra note 5, at 64.

83

See Section II.A, supra.

84

Id.
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indicate that Rapid Re-Housing could help some individuals, just a narrower and, largely
different, population than anticipated. Specifically, although Rapid Re-Housing has often been
proposed as a solution for homeless families, the current program is actually best suited to moving
single adults—who are sometimes ineligible for assistance—toward independent, affordable, and
sustainable housing over the one-year period.
A. Studies on Rapid Re-Housing’s Effectiveness Compared to Other Subsidized Housing and
Shelter-Based Programs
City governments frequently claim Rapid Re-Housing as a success by broadcasting the
low numbers of families and individuals they identify as “returning to shelter” after being in the
program. In the District specifically, Rapid Re-Housing’s promoters often point to a low number
of actual evictions as further success in the program. Yet detailed data about outcomes for
families and individuals in Rapid Re-Housing are especially hard to find.
One of the most in-depth examinations of Rapid Re-Housing’s effect on participant
families is HUD’s July 2015 “Family Options Study.”85 The study attempts to measure the effects
of four types of housing interventions: (1) permanent housing subsidies; (2) Rapid Re-Housing;
(3) project-based transitional housing; and (4) “usual care” (typically a time-limited stay in a
homeless shelter).86 The study included families with at least one child under age 15 who had
been in a homeless shelter seven or more days. The study attempted to randomly assign families
to the four interventions, but program availability and eligibility requirements made perfect
randomization impossible.87 Data were collected from a baseline survey, tracking surveys at 6 and
12 months post-placement, 18-month follow-up surveys, and additional child assessments.88
Much like the typical homeless family in the District, “[t]he typical family in the study consisted
of an adult woman, 29 years old, living with one or two of her children in an emergency
shelter.”89 Also much like in the District, the majority of families had no employment income at
baseline (83 percent), with more than half not working for six months prior to baseline. 90 The
most frequently reported source of income was Supplemental Nutrition Assistance (SNAP or food
stamps), with approximately 41 percent of families also receiving cash assistance (TANF) at
baseline.91 In addition, 26 percent of families had previously been evicted and 35 percent had no
rental history as a leaseholder.92
The study looked at 18 measures of program impact, divided into groups by subject
area.93 Measures of housing stability included reporting on (1) night homeless, (2) doubling up,

85

Family Options Study, supra note 1.

86

Id. at xvi.

87

Id at xvii. (“Of the 2,282 families enrolled in the study, 474 had all four randomization options available,
1,544 families had three randomization options, and 264 families had two randomization options.”)
88

Id. at xviii.

89

Id. at xix.

90

Id.

91

Id.

92

Id.

93

Id. at xxv.
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(3) shelter stays in the prior 12 months, (4) number of places lived in past six months, and (5) any
stay in emergency shelter in months 7-18 after program placement. The study also measured
family preservation, adult well-being, child well-being, and self-sufficiency (work for pay, total
income and food security). 94
Compared to “usual care,” Rapid Re-Housing had no measurable effect on any of these
measures of housing stability.95 Nor did Rapid Re-Housing appear to coincide with any
significant improvement on other measures of wellbeing over a twenty-month period, compared
even to remaining in shelter.96 This result contrasted greatly with receipt of a permanent housing
subsidy, which dramatically reduced housing instability on all measures and increased well-being.
One thing the Family Options Study does make clear is that a long-term housing subsidy
offers a greater benefit to participant families than all other housing programs—including Rapid
Re-Housing—on measures of both housing stability and well-being. Moreover, at least in the
short-term, Rapid Re-Housing and long-term subsidies, such as Section 8 vouchers, have similar
monthly costs.97
On the other hand, Rapid Re-Housing programs are less costly than project-based
transitional housing and “usual care” (typically involving shelters and some use of project-based
transitional housing).98 Rapid Re-Housing participants also showed greater “work effort” at the
twenty-month mark compared to those receiving long-term subsidies. But prior studies indicate
that this negative effect on “work effort,” as measured by employment income, may decrease over
time while the family continues receiving the long-term subsidy, resulting in increased
employment income for families in the long-term subsidy program.99
Other studies have found that while families in Rapid Re-Housing may experience low
levels of return to homeless shelters, they typically experience high levels of housing instability—
in one study, only 25 percent of families remained in the housing in which they received the
Rapid Re-Housing subsidy after one year.100 In the same study, 57 percent of participant families
reported struggling to find money to pay rent one year after program exit. 101

94

Id.

95

Id. at xxvi. The permanent housing subsidy also led to measurable improvements on other measures,
including adult and child well-being. The only area in which Rapid Re-Housing “outperformed” the permanent subsidies
was that families receiving Rapid Re-Housing reported more employment income and higher overall income than families
receiving the permanent subsidy—at least in the short-term.
96

Id. at 83-88.

97

Id. at 138.

98

Id. at xxx (citing Mills et. al., The Effects of Housing Vouchers on Welfare Families, 2006).

99

Id.

100

Urban Institute, Rapid Re-housing What the Research Says, at 17, June 2015, http://www.urban.org
/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/2000265-Rapid-Re-housing-What-the-Research-Says.pdf
(last
accessed
January 24, 2016).
101

Id. at 18.
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B. Studies Offer Only Limited Information About Which Populations Are Most Likely to Benefit
from Rapid Re-Housing
Multiple studies have acknowledged an ongoing need for research exploring which
families and individuals are most likely to benefit from Rapid Re-Housing short-term subsidy
program.102 The Family Options Study attempted to examine whether certain more vulnerable
families would respond differently to different interventions by scoring families on two aggregate
measures of vulnerability: psychosocial challenges and barriers to housing. 103 The study
concluded that the data did not reflect significant differences in outcomes for families scoring
highest on these two measures of vulnerability as compared to other families in any of the
programs.104 It is possible that the use of only two measures obscures the effects of more specific
types of vulnerability.
Specifically, the Study uses two aggregate measures of vulnerability, classified as
psychosocial factors and barriers to housing, in order to divide participants into groups and
compare outcomes. Psychosocial factors include any and all of the following: health and mental
health conditions, including substance abuse problems and PTSD, domestic violence, felony
conviction, history of foster care/institutionalization as a child, and disability of a family
member.105 Barriers to housing include fifteen factors, among them unemployment, lack of
income, family composition, rental history (including history of eviction), and lack of
transportation.106
Different factors included in these aggregate indices could be expected to affect housing
stability and program success in vastly different ways. For example, substance abuse and other
health conditions can make it very difficult for an individual to maintain housing outside of the
supportive housing context due to difficulties posed by the effects of the health condition for lease
compliance and living in close quarters with others. On the other hand, being a recent survivor of
domestic violence likely presents short-term housing difficulties (e.g., paying a security deposit
and relocating to a safe neighborhood) but would not necessarily be expected to affect a head of
household’s ability to sustain new housing once located. Domestic violence and mental health
conditions are two factors that interplay with housing in sometimes very different ways, but
which are lumped together in one vulnerability index. It therefore seems plausible that the indices
may have erased the effects of a single type of vulnerability and its relationship to a housing
subsidy program and made it impossible to measure the impact of particular vulnerabilities facing
homeless families.107

102

Family Options Study, supra note 1 at 19.

103

Id. at xxvii.

104

Id.

105

Id. at 31. The authors of the Family Options Study do note that several of these factors, examined
individually, have been connected to residential instability in prior studies. See id. (citing Hayes, Maureen A., Megan
Zonneville, and Ellen L. Bassuk, The SHIFT Study: Final Report. Waltham, MA: The National Center on Family
Homelessness (2013)).
106

Id.

107

The study’s authors acknowledge that the small sample size makes it impossible to rule out the
possibility that psychosocial factors and/or barriers to housing, even in the aggregate, moderate the impact of various
housing programs for homeless families. Id. at 132.
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IV. RAPID RE-HOUSING’S CURRENT MODEL COULD BENEFIT A NARROW SUBSET
OF THE HOMELESS POPULATION WITH SOME PROGRAM MODIFICATIONS
In this section, we attempt to fill the gap in understanding of who is most likely to
benefit from Rapid Re-Housing’s short-term subsidy by returning to the data explored in Section
0 regarding the circumstances of homeless individuals and families and the state of the D.C. rental
market. To the extent Rapid Re-Housing remains a short-term subsidy only, we recommend
narrowing the program’s target population in order to focus its resources on individuals and
families most likely to benefit from a short-term subsidy. We also recommend program
modifications to make even a short-term subsidy a better, more reliable approach to sustainably
housing the homeless and near-homeless populations. In particular, we recommend: (1) extending
the length of program to guarantee at least a one-year term; (2) creating enforceable rights,
including the right to have the tenant portion of the rent calculated at 30 percent of household
income; (3) incorporating safeguards for the unexpected; and (4) non-financial support for
participant families.
A. Targeting the Right Populations
As described above, there is a dramatic mismatch between rental rates in the District and
the incomes earned by individuals with very low incomes in the District—even those working
full-time at minimum wage.108 Some individuals and a very small subset of families, would
benefit from Rapid Re-Housing’s short-term subsidy, particularly with the program modifications
described below. The task is to identify those individuals.
Sadly, we can exclude most homeless families at the outset. The least costly option for
families with one adult and two children may be a one-bedroom unit, if that bedroom is at least
150 square feet.109 As described above in Section 0, a conservative estimate for rent of a onebedroom apartment in the least costly District neighborhoods is $1150—requiring a monthly
income of $3833 to be affordable at the 30 percent level. At minimum wage, this requires the
head of a single-adult household to work approximately 91 hours per week—a nearly impossible
task. And full-time minimum wage is itself a rarity.110 The most commonly reported source of
income for homeless families captured in the point-in-time study is Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families, or TANF.111 For a family with two children and no other income, the average
TANF benefit as of October 1, 2015 is $441—an amount that cannot cover fair-market rent for an
apartment of any size in the District.112
Given these rental market realities, Rapid Re-Housing’s short-term subsidy (in isolation)
may only be a viable solution for individuals and families made homeless by genuinely short-term

108

See Section III.B.3, supra.

109

International Property Maintenance Code, Section 404.4.1.

110

See Section II.B.2, supra.

111

See Section II.A, supra.

112

See Ife Floyd and Liz Schott, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, TANF Benefits Have Fallen by
More Than 20 percent in Most States and Continue to Erode, at 2, Oct. 1, 2015, http://www.cbpp.org/research/familyincome-support/tanf-cash-benefits-have-fallen-by-more-than-20-percent-in-most-states (last accessed January 24, 2016).
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crises.113 For example, a victim of domestic violence fleeing her abuser and facing sudden
homelessness could benefit from a short-term subsidy and, possibly, not need extensive further
housing assistance. As noted above, roughly 15 percent of homeless families identified domestic
violence as an immediate cause of their homelessness, 114 so it is possible that targeting survivors
of domestic violence as potential Rapid Re-Housing beneficiaries could help a substantial number
of people. Similarly, the program could be a good match for (1) families that include an adult
worker entering the job market for the first time, (2) households including adults with reasons to
believe they could see a rapid increase in wages and/or hours over a roughly one-year period, (3)
households including at least one worker enrolled in a training program that leads to a
significantly increased expected income in a year, or (4) households facing demonstrably
temporary financial crises.
As a result, Rapid Re-Housing’s short-term subsidies (at least as currently implemented)
may be a better solution for individuals than for families. Among single adults who are homeless
and captured in the point-in-time survey, roughly 19 percent of them reported being employed.
There are still major limitations. The survey does not provide wage information or specific
information about whether individuals reporting employment income are underemployed.
Assuming for argument’s sake that individuals reporting employment income are fully employed
at 40 hours a week, the individual still has only approximately $583 to spend on housing, if that
housing is to be sustainable over the long-term. This is an amount that could pay for a room in a
shared house, but would not cover an efficiency. Rapid Re-Housing assistance to move that
individual into an efficiency or a one-bedroom around the $1005 target might be reasonable, but
only if they are expected to have a monthly income of roughly $3,015 (hourly wages of
approximately $18.11 for 40 hours a week or roughly $15 for 50 hours a week).115
Given the small subset of the homeless and near-homeless population with a reasonable
likelihood of achieving sustainable, permanent housing through Rapid Re-Housing as currently
implemented in the District, it becomes critical to connect with individuals likely to benefit from
the program at the earliest possible moment. As shown above, individual adults experiencing
short-term financial crises are likely the best candidates for successful Rapid Re-Housing.
Effective Rapid Re-Housing programs should accordingly target the episodically homeless and/or

113
See Rachel Rintelmann, City Paper Article Highlights Shortcomings of Rapid Rehousing, April 3, 2015,
http://www.makingjusticereal.org/city-paper-article-highlights-shortcomings-of-rapid-rehousing (last accessed January 26,
2016).
114

Section II.A, supra.

115

On the other hand, it is unlikely that many of the 62 percent of homeless adults who report no income at
the point-in-time survey would be able to afford even a room in a shared house without any subsidy within a year (unless
the lack of income is clearly temporary). In addition, for individuals with disabilities relying on Social Security Income
($730 monthly) or Social Security Disability Insurance (likely to be approximately $962 for a worker with a disability who
earned about $20,000 annually prior to onset of the disability), even single rooms for rent are likely unaffordable under
current market conditions once the subsidy terminates. Supplemental Security Income (SSI) is about $730 monthly and is
a program for the persons who are elderly, blind and have disabilities. Social Security Disability Insurance is an income
support program for individuals who have worked a minimum number of qualifying quarters but now are unable to work.
SSDI’s monthly benefit varies but is likely to be approximately $962 for a worker with a disability who earned about
$20,000 annually prior to onset of the disability. See SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Benefits for People with
Disabilities, https://www.ssa.gov/disability/; see also https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/poverty/report/
2013/05/30/64681/the-facts-on-social-security-disability-insurance-and-supplemental-security-income-for-workers-withdisabilities/ at 2.
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individuals not yet homeless but at risk of homelessness—such as individuals who have just
experienced a temporary loss of income. This would require expanding Rapid Re-Housing’s
availability to those on the precipice of homelessness.116
It would also require looking beyond homeless shelters. Homeless shelters are unlikely
to capture the best candidates for Rapid Re-Housing’s temporary subsidy: based on the figures
from the 2015 District Survey, relatively few individuals identified in the point-in-time surveys
are candidates for genuine success in the current Rapid Re-Housing program. Of course, some
individuals and families who may benefit from the program may come through homeless shelters,
and they should still be connected with the program.
However, more appropriate intake sites likely include domestic violence service centers
and shelters, the Office of Unemployment Compensation, and the District’s Emergency Rental
Assistance (ERAP) providers. Emergency Rental Assistance is available to assist individuals with
disabilities or families with minor children to pay back-rent up to certain caps. Allowing ERAP
providers to make referrals of individuals and families in short-term crises to the Rapid ReHousing program could also expand the program’s likelihood of including within its ambit
individuals most likely to benefit from the program.
B. Length of Short-Term Subsidy
The length of the subsidy is also likely to be related to the probability of success. As
discussed above, Rapid Re-Housing subsidies do not currently guarantee a 12-month subsidy
period despite only being available to individuals exiting homelessness—i.e., individuals who
must sign a new (almost always 12-month) lease in order to become housed.117 Under our
proposed modification, individuals currently housed but experiencing financial crises placing
them at imminent risk of homelessness may be well-served by a renewable three-month subsidy
(for example, individuals being referred into the program through the unemployment insurance
office, domestic violence intake sites, and emergency rental assistance sites). However, for
individuals exiting homelessness and signing new leases in order to be housed, failing to
guarantee the subsidy for a twelve-month period places the person at a significant disadvantage in
their effort to find stable housing. 118
In addition, the subsidy should be renewable especially in circumstances in which
individuals are progressing toward being able to afford the unit. As noted in Section III.B above,
for many families affording a two-bedroom apartment requires a 180 percent increase in income.
If an individual has increased their hourly wage and/or the hours they are working, but is still
unable to afford the unit without the subsidy, cutting off the subsidy would almost certainly send
the individual into crisis and possibly return them to homelessness.

116

In late 2015, some Rapid Re-Housing providers began making assistance available to families at risk of
homelessness, but the focus of the program remains on those already homeless.
117
See also Section III, supra; See Fourth Emergency and Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 52 at § 7805.4
(providing for quarterly reviews of eligibility during program participation); see also id. at § 7805.9 (stated goal of
program is progression out of the assistance within 12 months or less).
118
Washington City Paper, A Long Way from Home, April 2, 2015, http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/
articles/47035/a-long-way-from-home-this-winter-was-supposed-to/.
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C. Enforceable Rights
As noted above, another shortcoming in the current Rapid Re-Housing program as
implemented in the District is that the regulations purport to make almost everything about the
program discretionary—leaving program participants without clear expectations or enforceable
rights.119 The regulations should be modified to clarify expectations for program participants and
allow them to understand their rights and obligations as Rapid Re-Housing participants. The term
of the program, as described above, should be at least one-year, subject to extensions, unless
program participants commit certain violations of program rules.120 Although extensions beyond
the one-year term could remain discretionary, regulations should include clear, enforceable
guidelines governing the exercise of that discretion.
In addition, the tenant portion of the rent should be calculated as 30 percent of household
income, without any exercise of discretion—this is what HUD and others have determined as a
sustainable rent burden and, as discussed above, already represents a significant burden for lowincome households.121 Requiring that extremely low-income households—and, beyond that,
households emerging from the crisis of recent homelessness and all the disruption that entails—
pay 40-60 percent of their household income in rent is truly unsustainable and results in severely
rent-burdened households even during the subsidy program. Tenant requirements for reporting
changes in income, and their entitlement to a recalculation of the rental subsidy upon such
changes, should be modeled on the rules for the federally subsidized Housing Choice Voucher
Program codified in the D.C. Code of Municipal Regulations and implemented already by the
D.C. Housing Authority.122
D. Safeguards for the Unexpected
Even after discontinuation of the rental subsidy, programs should continue to provide
crisis safeguards, including resumption of the rental subsidy, emergency utility assistance if no
other assistance is available, financial coaching/counseling if desired by the beneficiary, and
referrals to other service providers.123

119

See Section III, supra.

120

Program rules and consequences (and protections) for alleged violations thereof could be modeled
closely on the family obligations for the Housing Choice Voucher Program. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.551.
121

See Section III.A, supra.

122

See D.C.M.R. 14-5300 et seq. Although the choice of organizations to implement the Rapid Re-Housing
subsidy program is beyond the scope of this article, it is also worth noting that many argue that the Housing Authority
could strengthen the program’s subsidy through implementation with its already vast experience in implementing the
Housing Choice Voucher Program and/or adoption of guidelines and practices similar to those in the Housing Choice
Voucher Program in D.C. See Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless, DC Needs a Housing Reality Check, September
27, 2013, http://www.legalclinic.org/dc-needs-a-housing-reality-check/ (last accessed January 26, 2016).
123

Program regulations prescribe a range of other services included within FRSP, including casework,
connections with other community resources, housing search assistance, and job placement and workforce development.
See supra note 52, at § 7805.2.
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E. Other Barriers to Renting
To be successful, the Rapid Re-Housing program must address non-financial barriers to
renting as well as financial barriers, especially when providing the subsidy to those who are
homeless at the point of entry into the program. This may include referring individuals for sealing
of criminal records that present barriers to renting and/or credit counseling or financial
coaching/counseling services.
V. LINKING RAPID RE-HOUSING TO LONG-TERM SOLUTIONS FOR THE RENTINCOME MISMATCH IN THE DISTRICT COULD EXPAND THE GROUP OF
BENEFICIARIES LIKELY TO SUCCEED THROUGH RAPID RE-HOUSING ASSISTANCE
To make D.C.’s Rapid Re-Housing a true Housing First solution for most of its intended
beneficiaries, the government would need to (1) pair it with affordable housing tied to minimum
wage (or other markers more relevant to very low-income families than Area Median Income), or
(2) use it as a bridge until a long-term subsidy becomes available. Whatever the solution, housing
costs should not exceed 30 percent of the individual’s income.
Below we briefly raise a few options. These are discussion points and do not purport to
provide an exclusive or complete solution to homelessness.
A. Creating and Preserving Affordable Housing for Very Low-Income Households
As explored in detail in Section III above, the main issue precluding meaningful success
of Rapid Re-Housing in cities like D.C. is the disparity between market rent and wages for lowincome (and extremely-low-income) individuals. For very low-income families to obtain
sustainable housing, the city must address the rent-wage mismatch and the lack of housing to the
extremely low-income households.
One way to address the rent-wage mismatch is to increase genuinely affordable
housing.124 While D.C. currently provides some affordable housing, it is not nearly enough to
meet the demand.125 As it turns out, even this affordable housing is not sustainable for many
families and individuals, as the prices are tied to a percentage of Area Median Income (“AMI”),
not to minimum wage. The AMI for the metropolitan D.C. area is $109,200 for family of four as
of 2015. Only a small fraction of D.C.’s affordable housing is available to individuals at below 30
percent of AMI, or roughly $32,000 a year. Much of the affordable housing is set aside for those
at 50 or 60 percent of AMI.126 Regardless, an assumed income of $32,000 is still $11,000 dollars a
year more than an individual can earn working full time at minimum wage. 127

124

See supra Section III (discussing the District’s minimum wage and the number of hours adult household
members would need to work to afford even the least expensive, market-rate housing in the District), and Appendix I,
illustrating average rent levels in a recent search in the District’s least-expensive neighborhoods.
125

See The District of Columbia Mandatory Inclusionary Zoning Maximum Household Income Limits,
2015,
http://dhcd.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/dhcd/publication/attachments/Inclusionary
percent20Zoning
percent20Income percent20Limits percent20- percent202015.pdf (last accessed Jan. 27, 2016).
126

Id.

127

See supra Section III.B.2.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol19/iss4/2

2016]

RETHINKING RAPID RE-HOUSING

331

In other words, to earn 30 percent of AMI working full-time in the District, a worker
needs to earn approximately $15 per hour.
For those earning minimum wage then, sustainable, affordable housing would need to be
available at rents that are roughly 30 percent of an individual’s monthly (or annual) salary at
minimum wage working 40 hours a week. 128 The city could encourage such units by modifying
the tax credits that it currently offers to increase the focus of housing that is affordable for those
earning 20 percent of AMI rather than targeting higher-income earning households that are still
well below AMI.129
A number of organizations and governments are working on creative solutions to
building affordable units, and provide some interesting, cooperative solutions to lower unit costs,
foster community, and reduce food and other related costs. 130 One example is Community First!
Village outside of Austin, which is a 27-acre master-planned community that will provide
affordable, sustainable housing and a supportive community for individuals who are chronically
homeless and have disabilities in Central Texas. The team is building tiny homes with the support
of volunteers, and includes amenities like a community garden, a workshop, and onsite medical
care. This could also be paired with creative efforts to preserve and rehabilitate the country’s
deteriorating subsidized housing stock. 131
It is also worth considering lower-cost options tailored to certain subsets of the homeless
population. For example, providing automatic subsidized (or free) housing to youth exiting the
foster system would likely significantly decrease the homeless population. 132 In addition to
providing a potentially prophylactic solution, it makes sense to provide a safety net to young
people without family supports, to give them time to find work, get an education, learn to manage
their finances, and just generally, to find their footing. One option that might be particularly wellsuited to young people would be to provide dorm-style housing with common facilities. In some
instances, this housing could be tied to educational or vocational training (GED, community
college, trades)—whether by partnering with schools, or providing on-site classes and training.

128

See supra Section III.A.

129

See Wes Rivers, D.C. Fiscal Policy Institute, Going, Going, Gone: D.C.’s Vanishing Affordable
Housing, D.C. FISCAL POLICY INSTITUTE, Mar. 12, 2015, http://www.dcfpi.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/GoingGoing-Gone-Rent-Burden-Final-3-6-15format-v2-3-10-15.pdf (last accessed Jan. 30, 2016). Cf. Tax Credit Allocation,
DEPT. OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, http://dhcd.dc.gov/service/tax-credit-allocation (federal tax credits
available for those building housing affordable to those at 60 percent of AMI) (last accessed Apr. 24, 2016); Inclusionary
Zoning Affordable Housing Program, OFFICE OF TAX AND REVENUE, http://otr.cfo.dc.gov/service/inclusionary-zoningaffordable-housing-program (D.C.’s local inclusionary zoning program supports housing deemed affordable at 50 percent
or 80 percent of AMI) (last accessed Apr. 24, 2016).
130

See, e.g., Community First! Village, MOBILE LOAVES & FISHES, http://mlf.org/community-first/; Ten
Solutions to the Housing Crisis—In Pictures, THE GUARDIAN, July 6, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/
artanddesign/gallery/2013/jul/06/architecture-housing-crisis-solutions; Creative Solutions to the San Francisco Housing
Crisis, SAN FRANCISCO PUBLIC PRESS, 2014, https://storify.com/sfpublicpress/creative-solutions-to-the-san-franciscohousing-cr.
131
See Preserving Affordable Rental Housing: A Snapshot of Growing Need, Current Threats, and
Innovative Solutions, HUD USER, Summer 2013, https://www.huduser.gov/portal/periodicals/em/summer13/
highlight1.html (last accessed January 25, 2016).
132
See Section II.A, supra (showing that roughly 25 percent of the homeless population, in particular adults
in families, were previously in the foster system).
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Policies and tax credits designed to encourage development of housing affordable to
those earning minimum-wage or less (20 percent or less of AMI based on current figures) could
increase affordable housing for a number of very low-income families and individuals. It is not a
viable solution, however, for individuals or families relying on SSI or temporary cash assistance
nor for those receiving SSDI in an amount under $30,000 annually. These individuals need
another solution, and Rapid Re-Housing would work for them only as a bridge to a more fulsome,
long-term subsidy.
B. Rapid Re-Housing as a Bridge Subsidy to Long-Term Subsidized Housing
Another, potentially complimentary, option is to make Rapid Re-Housing a bridge
subsidy to long-term subsidized housing, either through the federally subsidized housing
programs (including the Housing Choice Voucher Program, public housing, site-based Section 8)
or locally-funded long-term rental subsidies, such as the Local Rent Subsidy Program (LRSP). 133
This would require a dramatic increase in the availability of all types of long-term subsidized
housing, and it would require significant reinvestment in those housing programs, including
vouchers, public housing, and site-based Section 8 housing.
We acknowledge that using Rapid Re-Housing as a bridge to long-term subsidized
housing may incentivize some individuals to not work towards rent independence. Studies show,
however, that the frequency and impact of these perverse incentives is often exaggerated. 134
Indeed, a comprehensive review found that any negative impact on earnings from Housing Choice
Vouchers disappeared to essentially zero after five years. 135 In addition, voucher-holders’
employment hours showed virtually no decline initially, and an increase in hours in the long
run.136 There was also a significant increase in employment and earnings in some populations as a
result of permanent housing subsidies.137 Moreover, Rapid Re-Housing’s current focus on
purportedly avoiding entitlements creates a number of problems in the other direction. 138 The
current regulations allow for termination at 18 months simply because time is up.139 The resulting
uncertainty is detrimental to the family, which is left wondering if they can continue to afford
their apartment,140 and will likely have to leave (voluntarily or involuntarily) once they are back

133

See Rivers, supra note 123.

134

See, e.g., D. Carlson et. al., Long-Term Effects of Public Low-Income Housing Vouchers on Labor
Market Outcomes (Institute for Research on Poverty Discussion, Paper No. 1363-09, Apr. 2009), http://www.irp.wisc.edu/
publications/dps/pdfs/dp136309.pdf.
135

Id. at 18.

136

Id. at 19-20 (“From the year of voucher receipt to five years post receipt, the average-quarters-worked
difference for the entire sample of caseheads goes from a statistically insignificant -.012 in the year of voucher receipt to a
marginally significant (z = 1.84) +.040 five years after voucher receipt.”).
137

Id. at 18. (“[T]raditionally disadvantaged populations—such as minorities or those with limited
education—may exhibit positive labor market outcomes as they may be most likely to use a voucher to move to
neighborhoods with superior employment or earnings opportunities.”).
138

See Section III, supra.

139

Id.

140

Although in D.C. an individual does not have to re-sign the lease (leases automatically convert to monthto-month tenancies upon expiration of the lease) and cannot be evicted for an expired lease, in other jurisdictions the
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to paying market rent. As the Family Options Study discussed above suggests, 141 this affects the
well-being of both the adults and the children.
We also recognize that even if long-term subsidized housing were more widely available,
there would be individuals for whom basic rental subsidies would not be an adequate solution.
Such individuals include people who need supportive services in order to stay housed, often
including individuals with significant disabilities, mental illnesses, and long histories of
homelessness.142 Careful attention would also have to be paid to ensure that individuals often
excluded from federally-subsidized housing programs, such as individuals with certain types of
criminal records or owing debts to a housing authority, have access to affordable housing
options.143
Of course, making long-term subsidies more widely available will require significant
financial expenditures. That said, the per-family, per-month marginal cost of a long-term subsidy
compared to Rapid Re-Housing is only $300—and the return on that investment is likely to be
significant.144 Perhaps the real issue is that a long-term subsidy is exactly what it sounds like: a
long-term subsidy that entitles the recipient to a property interest in continued receipt of that
subsidy for as long as they remain eligible.145 Short-term subsidies, such as Rapid Re-Housing,
can easily be cancelled when the political will to continue funding disappears. While this may be
politically appealing, evidence suggests that these short-term subsidies are less effective and often
leave families worse off than they are now. At a certain point, cities with tight rental markets like
the District need to be willing to make the necessary investment if they want to claim that a longterm solution to homelessness is available to their residents.

effects of this uncertainty would be further exacerbated by the need to renew a lease after one year or face eviction.
141

Section IV.A, supra.

142

Permanent Supportive Housing, U.S. INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON HOMELESSNESS, https://www.usich.
gov/solutions/housing/permanent-supportive-housing (last accessed Jan. 25, 2016).
143

These housing limitations are beyond the scope of this article, but we note that they are very
problematic. See, e.g., Nadia Pflaum, An Old Misdemeanor Kept Maurice Alexander From Accessing Housing,
WASHINGTON CITY PAPER, Nov. 13, 2015, http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/blogs/housingcomplex/2015/11/13/anold-misdemeanor-kept-maurice-alexander-from-accessing-housing/ (last accessed Jan. 25, 2016).
144
Family Options Study, supra note 1, at 138. For Fiscal Year 2015, D.C.’s Rapid Re-Housing budget was
$26 million, compared to $13 million for the D.C. General Family Shelter and $11.9 million for permanent supportive
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APPENDIX I
Fair Market Rents in Ten Most Affordable Neighborhoods in D.C. (January 2016)*
Neighborhood
Anacostia
Barry Farm
Brightwood
Chillum
Congress Heights
Deanwood
Fort Dupont Park
Hillcrest
Marshall Heights
Randle Heights
Average Price

Efficiency per month
(w/utilities)
$1,063
$1,063
$1,163
$1,112
$971
$907
$954
$1,054
$858
$920
$1006.5

One-bedroom
per
month (w/utilities)
$1,250
$1,250
$1,277
$1,141
$1,115
$1,067
$1,122
$1,240
$983
$1,056
$1150.1

Two-bedroom
per
month (w/utilities)
$1,438
$1,438
$1,747
$1,775
$1,357
$1,524
$1,340
$1,534
$1,283
$1,300
$1473.6

* Data comes from the District of Columbia Housing Authority (DCHA) and was
accurate through March 2, 2016. This is the amount DCHA is willing to pay for a unit in each
neighborhood. The DCHA Fair Market Rent figures were adjusted effective March 2, 2016 to
better conform with market realities. See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA HOUSING AUTHORITY, HCVP
RENTS, http://www.dchousing.org/rent_hcvp.aspx (last accessed May 21, 2016). The HCVPapproved rents for all neighborhoods included in this study increased effective March 2, 2016,
meaning that the rent mismatch is even more dramatic than the figures relied upon in this Article
indicate. In addition, the ten most affordable neighborhoods in the District changed based on the
March 2016 FMR standards. Trinidad and Brentwood were added to the list of least expensive
neighborhoods as measured by FMR while Chillum and Brightwood were removed.
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